A convicted fraudster and one-time law student has failed in an attempt to sue a regional newspaper for defamation, harassment, misuse of private information and negligence over a report of a court hearing at which she was sentenced for theft.

Camille Richardson took action against Trinity Mirror Merseyside Ltd, publisher of the Liverpool Echo, and Neil Docking, a reporter with the newspaper, over its reporting of a hearing at Liverpool Crown Court on May 20 of a hearing at which she was sentenced for stealing £985 from a Syrian refugee.

But Mr Justice Soole dismissed her claims, saying they had no prospect of success, and also rejected her applications for an anonymity order and for injunctive relief against the newspaper.

The judge said Ms Richardson was convicted of theft in her absence following a trial at Liverpool Crown Court in December last year.

On May 20 she appeared at the same court for a hearing at which she was given a suspended prison sentence and ordered to do unpaid work and pay compensation to her victim.

A report of the hearing appeared on the Liverpool Echo website the same day, under the headline “Woman stole £1,000 from Syrian refugee and blew it on ‘selfish’ shopping spree at Liverpool ONE”.

A slightly shorter version of the story appeared in the print edition of the newspaper on May 22, under the headline “‘Nice of you to turn up’ – judge reprimands stay-away crook.”

Ms Richardson launched her claim on May 25, and alleged that various details about her – references to where she was now living and working – were included in the reports even though the newspaper had given her assurances that they would not because it was aware that she had been the victim of domestic violence and feared for her safety because of her abusive ex-partner.

The newspaper and Mr Docking argued that the articles were fair and accurate reports of proceedings in the Crown Court and enjoyed absolute or qualified privilege; that the action was an abuse of process instigated for the purpose of a collateral attack on the decision of the Crown Court; and that the other alleged causes of action were a legally unfounded attempt to circumvent the law protecting fair and accurate reports of court proceedings.

Both Ms Richardson and the defendants applied for summary judgment – and Mr Justice Soole struck Ms Richardson’s claim out, saying none of her claims and causes of action had any prospect of success.

On the libel claim, he said that there was no basis to challenge the fairness and substantial accuracy of the reports of the Court hearing, and that Ms Richardson’s claim that the reports were published with malice – that the defendants had a dominant improper motive for publishing them – was no more than assertion.

The reference in the reports to her previous conviction was also covered by section 8 (3) of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act, which was “a complete answer to the objection to the report of that part of the hearing”.

In any event, Ms Richardson’s challenge to the report of her offence and conviction was defeated by section 13 of the Civil Evidence Act 1968, which provides that the conviction was conclusive evidence of the commission of the offence, and by the law which barred the action as an abuse of process because it amounted to a collateral attack on the decision of the Criminal Court.

There was “no basis” to Ms Richardson’s claims for breach of confidence and/or misuse of private information – the information was given in open court and there could be no reasonable expectation of privacy, said Mr Justice Soole.

“The alleged assurances could not convert that public information into the category of privacy or confidence,” he went on.

“The various authorities relied on by Ms Richardson have no bearing on the public and open nature of information and the protection provided to those who make fair and accurate reports of Court proceedings and (where not contemporaneous) who do so without malice in its true legal meaning.

“Whatever the circumstances of the claimant’s request for a private hearing in the Crown Court, it was in public.”

On the harassment claim, the judge said he saw “no arguable basis” for the proposition that the defendants’ reporting was oppressive, unreasonable, an abuse of the freedom of the press or gave rise to exceptional circumstances or otherwise constituted harassment within the meaning of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997.

He also saw no arguable basis for Ms Richardson’s claim, in negligence, that there was a legally recognised duty of care to the effect that the defendants would not publish information which was disclosed in open court.